IN November 2023, with 52% of the vote, Daniel Noboa became the youngest president in Ecuador’s history, after being elected to finish the 18-month term of Guillermo Lasso, who resigned in the midst of an impeachment trial. Despite presenting himself as the president of the new politics in Ecuador, Daniel Noboa was trapped in the country’s old dynamics of struggle and political backwardness, repeating the entrenched practices of a past from which he sought to distance himself. Largely unknown and with little previous political experience, Noboa ran as a new pragmatic candidate at the head of the National Democratic Action (ADN) coalition.

A successful start

His election epitomized the trend of political “outsiders” and “millennial” figures in Latin America, coming to power embodying political change and capitalizing on growing dissatisfaction with the status quo. Noboa represented new blood and the promise of ending the old politics that had paralyzed Ecuador. During his inaugural speech, the new president promised to break the cycle of political vendetta that was hindering legislative processes and delaying much-needed reforms.

Surprisingly, the new administration managed to put an end to the turbulent political crisis of the previous government, navigating a “calm political sea” during its first months and with virtually no opposition. The ruling ADN allied with the Social Christian Party (PSC) and the Citizen’s Revolution (RC) in the National Assembly, establishing a relatively united bloc within the legislature.

Following the upsurge in criminal violence, Noboa declared a state of internal war, implementing a strong state of emergency, militarizing public security and labeling the gangs as terrorist groups. While human rights organizations criticized the government’s security measures for suspending fundamental civil liberties, it received broad popular support, the backing of opposition parties and the sympathy of the international community. Noboa positioned himself as the main opponent of insecurity and his approval rating rose to 80%, making him the most popular president in South America.

The beginning of the debacle 

However, political stability collapsed in April 2024 following a police raid on the Mexican embassy to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas on corruption charges, in violation of international law. The move was intended, in part, to win public support ahead of a security-focused referendum by portraying the government as committed to fighting the corruption of previous administrations. However, the event provoked a major domestic political crisis, as well as international condemnation. RC called for the resignation of President Daniel Noboa and joined the opposition in Ecuador’s National Assembly, breaking the alliance with Noboa’s ADN party. With the end of the legislative pact, ADN lost its ability to carry forward its agenda and pass laws with the support of the majority.

While the opposition parties declared that they would support the referendum’s security reforms because of their overwhelming popular support, the calm in which the Noboa government had managed to navigate turned into a storm. After the political pact fell apart, the Assembly went from organizing itself in alliances to a struggle of “all against all”. Since then, Noboa has governed the country against the tide in a political landscape where even the consensus on public security collapsed and the once praised security strategy of the “Phoenix Plan” is the object of harsh criticism.

The use of impeachment as a weapon is also gaining prominence, as the parliament approved requests for the removal of four sitting ministers filed by opposition members. Pending impeachment proceedings against officials of the previous government of Guillermo Lasso were terminated to allow for accelerated impeachment of sitting ministers.

Political disputes, lack of consensus and frequent clashes hamper governance and the implementation of legislation, and the president increasingly uses his veto power to shelve bills. In 11 months of government, the Executive vetoed six bills submitted by the Legislative Branch. The government twice vetoed articles of the Social Security Law, preventing its adoption even after the Assembly reviewed the bill. This controversial double veto, which had never happened before in the country’s history, was labelled unconstitutional by opposition parties.

Ecuador’s Constitutional Court has also declared Noboa’s repeated states of exception unconstitutional, since the “internal armed conflict” that the government has invoked five times as the legal basis for its measure does not exist. Noboa recently had to change his justification to conditions of “serious internal disturbances,” which defies his popular narrative of open warfare against organized crime.

Ultimately, Noboa’s government was destabilized by infighting between the president and the vice president, Veronica Abad. According to the Ecuadorian Constitution, Noboa must resign 45 days before the election to campaign and hand over to Abad, with whom he has an enigmatic and contentious relationship. Upon assuming the presidency, Noboa “exiled” her to Tel Aviv on an Israeli-Palestinian mediation mission and has recently called for impeachment proceedings to remove her before the 2025 election campaign. Opposition parties have supported Abad, despite her fierce criticism in the past, blocking legislative motions to strip her of her immunity.

In August, Abad filed a complaint against Noboa and other government officials with the Electoral Disputes Tribunal for political violence, a serious crime punishable by suspension of political rights for up to four years, which could prevent the president’s re-election. The government responded by calling the action a coup attempt to overthrow the president as part of a broader conspiracy in collusion with opposition parties. In November, the government suspended Abad for 150 days for “unjustified abandonment” of his duties for the delay following the order for his transfer from Israel to Turkey.

Another dysfunctional government

While Noboa promised to put an end to “old politics” in Ecuador, in recent months he has perpetuated the same dynamic that paralyzes policymaking. His immediate goal, upon taking office, to garner the popular support necessary for his re-election and his lack of political experience prevented him from pursuing a pragmatic and stable program congruent with the political opposition, opting instead for drastic measures that would generate public attention.

Since then, the administration has been labelled as a “government of improvisations,” relying on reactive stopgap actions and improvised solutions rather than comprehensive planning to address the different crises. This has aggravated the institutional crisis in Ecuador, characterized by low levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, highlighting the conditions of a torn social fabric and a weakened political system lacking public legitimacy.

By Benjamin Kurylo